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REMEDIES SYMPOSIUM 
REEXAMINING BIVENS AFTER ZIGLAR V. ABBASI 
By Bernard W. Bell* 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics1 the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized a damages cause of 
action for constitutional violations. The Bivens doctrine has had an 
uncertain history, to say the least. The Supreme Court’s decisions last 
term, Ziglar v. Abbasi2 and Hernandez v. Mesa,3 provide an occasion to 
revisit the doctrine. In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court expressed a preference 
for the array of non-damages remedies, including direct Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) review, internal agency review, equitable remedies, 
and declaratory remedies, inter alia, over creating a Bivens damages 
remedy. Bivens itself contains the seeds of this approach. Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence explained that the Court had implied a damages remedy 
because “for people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”4  The 
Court’s “any port in the storm” approach is insufficiently demanding of 
alternative remedial schemes.  This paper will explore the necessary 
prerequisites for acceptable alternative remedies. 
Section I discusses the development of the Bivens doctrine and last 
term’s Bivens decisions. Section II discusses the relationship between 
damages and administrative remedies in the context of non-constitutional 
torts. Section III proposes a contextual approach for determining when 
Bivens relief should be available. 
I. BIVENS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
Section 1983 provides citizens and non-citizens a remedy against 
state officials who violate their federal constitutional rights.5 However, 
* Professor of Law and Herbert Hannoch Scholar, Rutgers Law School (Newark).
1. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
2. 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
3. Id.
4. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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Congress has never provided an analogous statutory damages remedy for 
federal officials’ constitutional torts. Ordinarily federal courts cannot 
create damages causes of action. Bivens, for the first time, implied a right 
of action for damages under a provision of the Constitution, namely the 
Fourth Amendment. The majority relied heavily upon the principle, 
articulated in Marbury v. Madison, that every right must have a remedy.6 
The Court initially expanded the scope of potential Bivens actions to 
encompass gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause in Davis v. Passman,7 and deliberate indifference to prisoners’ 
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment in Carlson v. 
Green.8 
In Davis v. Passman, Congressman Passman fired Davis, his deputy 
administrative assistant, believing the position should be held by a man.9 
Carlson involved a federal prisoner, Joseph Jones, Jr., suffering from 
chronic asthma. On the day Jones died, no prison official called a doctor 
to examine him even though he remained in the prison hospital for eight 
hours. Defendant Walters, a non-licensed nurse, tried to use an inoperable 
respirator on Jones. Walters then administered thorazine, which was 
contra-indicated for asthma. Jones died 30 minutes after Walters 
administered a second injection.10 
Bivens, Passman, and Carlson each involve an exercise of discretion 
in the individual case rather than the adoption of broadly-applicable 
policies. None of the cases provided a meaningful review of the exercise 
of discretion or the inaction that constituted the constitutional violation. 
And two of the three, Bivens and Carlson, arose in a law enforcement 
context. 
Since 1980, the Court has consistently rejected Bivens claims, 
describing expansion of Bivens as a “disfavored” activity.11 Often the 
Court refuses to imply a damages remedy.12 The Court has refused to 
allow Bivens claims against federal agencies,13 held respondeat superior 
liability inappropriate,14 and crafted robust absolute and qualified 
6. 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803); see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
7. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
8. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
9. Davis, 442 U.S. at 230. 
10. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 670-71 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
11. Ziglar, 137 S.Ct. at 1857.
12. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (termination from federal employment);
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414 (1988) (termination of social security benefits). 
13. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
14. Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
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immunity defenses.15  Often in refusing to imply a cause of action the 
Court has noted the existence of other remedies,16 either remedies 
provided by agency administrative processes, equitable remedies 
available to courts, or even federal statutory or state tort law damages 
remedies.17 
Moreover, even when no alternative remedy exists, some lower 
courts refrain from creating a Bivens remedy unless the absence of 
alternative remedies can be attributed to legislative oversight.18  However, 
remedial lacunae often result from judicially-crafted justiciability rules 
that reveal little about Congress’ preferences regarding the availability of 
judicial review.19 
This preference for other remedies could be explained by the Court’s 
legitimacy concerns, which make any congressionally-crafted or state law 
remedy preferable to a judicially-created Bivens remedy. But in addition, 
the Court may consider damages remedies a last resort due to their 
implications for federal officials. In Butz v. Economou, Justice Rehnquist 
observed that Marbury v. Madison “leaves no doubt that the high position 
of a Government official does not insulate his actions from judicial 
review.”20 Marbury v. Madison and similar cases “involved equitable-
type relief by way of mandamus or injunction.”21 Such equitable remedies 
offered “better tailoring of the competing need to vindicate individual 
rights” and “the equally vital need,” that “federal officials exercising 
discretion . . . be unafraid to take vigorous action” in the public interest.22 
The first of last term’s Bivens cases, Ziglar v. Abbasi, is one of many 
that have arisen out of the federal government’s response to global 
terrorism.23 After the September 11 attacks, the FBI detained over 700 
aliens on immigration charges. Many were subject to a “hold-until-cleared 
policy.” Six detainees held at a federal detention facility and subjected to 
the hold-until-cleared policy initiated a Bivens suit. They alleged that they 
were randomly strip-searched and subjected to a pattern of “physical and 
15. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (absolute immunity); Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603 (1999) (qualified immunity).  
16. Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 127 (2012); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550
(2007); Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 414; Bush, 462 U.S. at 368, 381-90. 
17. Carlson, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-95.
18. Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2336 
(2013); Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 708, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert denied, 557 U.S. 919 (2009); 
Zuspann v. Brown, 60 F.3d 1156, 1161 (5th Cir. 1995).  
19. See infra text accompanying notes 82-89. 
20. 438 U.S. 478, 523 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 523-24. 
23. See JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 31-56 (2017). 
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verbal abuse.”24 They sued former Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
former FBI Director Robert Mueller, and former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar. They also sued the 
detention facility’s warden for failing to intervene. 
Plaintiffs asserted four constitutional claims. First, that the harshness 
of their confinement violated their Fifth Amendment substantive due 
process rights. Second, that such harsh treatment due their race, religion, 
or national origin deprived them of equal protection. Third, that the 
punitive strip searches violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Fourth, 
that the warden’s failure to intervene violated the substantive due process 
component of the Fifth Amendment.25 
Hernandez v. Mesa was a much simpler case. Mesa, a border patrol 
agent, fatally shot Sergio Güereca, a 15–year–old Mexican national.  At 
the time, Güereca was standing near a cement culvert that separates El 
Paso, Texas, from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. Hernández and several friends 
had run up the culvert’s embankment on the United States side, touched 
the border fence, and returned to Mexican territory. Agent Mesa had fired 
the fatal shot from the U.S. side of the border.26 
A majority refused to permit a Bivens claim in Ziglar, and, in a brief 
per curiam, remanded Hernandez. The decisions hardly clarified the 
Bivens doctrine. The Court kept in place its obvious distaste for Bivens 
liability, while refusing to inter the doctrine. Justice Kennedy outlined a 
test for recognition of new Bivens claims that required reasoning by 
analogy to the three 1970s/1980s era Supreme Court decisions in which 
Bivens liability was recognized. In particular, lower courts must now 
determine whether plaintiff’s claims differ “in a meaningful way” from 
the ones raised in the Bivens trilogy.27 
A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the of-
ficers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or speci-
ficity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an 
officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; 
the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operat-
ing; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning 
of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previ-
ous Bivens cases did not consider.28 
Justice Kennedy then demonstrated just how strict lower courts’ 
24. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1853.
25. Id. at 1847. 
26. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017). 
27. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859-60. 
28. Id. at 1860. 
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analogical reasoning should be, addressing the Ziglar v. Abbasi plaintiffs’ 
allegation that the warden had encouraged, or willfully ignored, 
correctional officers’ abuse of detainees.29  The Court recognized the 
parallels with Carlson, but noted four significant differences between the 
cases. First, the Ziglar plaintiffs were making a Fifth Amendment claim, 
not an Eighth Amendment claim. The Court did not explain why the 
distinction mattered. Second, judicial guidance regarding wardens’ 
supervisory obligations for pre-trial detainees was far less developed than 
the law governing wardens’ supervisory obligations for prisoners serving 
their sentences. Third, the alternative remedies available to the Ziglar 
plaintiffs, injunctive relief and a potential habeas corpus petition, differed 
from the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) damages action available to the 
inmate in Carlson. Fourth, since Carlson, Congress had enacted the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, without making any provision for 
stand-alone damages claims against federal jailers.30 
Formally, the Court merely remanded Hernandez v. Mesa for further 
consideration in light of Ziglar v. Abbasi.31 But the majority’s approach 
virtually dooms the case to failure. Though Hernandez v. Mesa involved 
a Fourth Amendment violation like Bivens, it can easily be distinguished 
from Bivens in terms of several factors the Ziglar Court cited. 
Part IIIB of the majority opinion in Ziglar v. Abbasi may hold the 
key to Bivens’ future development. The Court observed that Bivens 
actions are not a “proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy,”32 
repeating a line first used in Correctional Services Corporation v. 
Malesko.  Justice Kennedy explained: “Even if the action is confined to 
the conduct of a particular Executive Officer in a discrete instance, these 
claims would call into question the formulation and implementation of a 
general policy.”33 Later, the majority returned to the theme, noting that 
respondent’s claims were particularly problematic Bivens claims because 
they “challenge[d] large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions 
of confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners.”34 
29. Id. at 1864. 
30. Id. at 1864-65. 
31. 137 S. Ct. at 2006-07 
32. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1862. (“To address those kinds of decisions, detainees may seek injunctive relief.”). 
A study of 200 Bivens complaints over an approximately 2-year span revealed that 6.5% were high-
profile efforts to change government policy, using Bivens in place of a conventional APA challenge.  
David Zaring, Three Models of Constitutional Torts, 2 J. TORT LAW 1, 12 (2008). 
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II. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION, AND THE APA 
The Federal Tort Claims Act35 provides a cause of action for “garden 
variety” torts.36 The statute includes several exceptions that retain the 
federal government’s sovereign immunity from particular types of 
claims.37 Most importantly for our purposes, is the discretionary function 
exception,38 meant to ensure that damages actions did not become a 
vehicle for challenging contestable policy determinations.39 Such 
decisions are to be assessed in the context of direct judicial review of 
agency action, which requires individuals to participate in the 
administrative process leading to the final agency decision and if 
aggrieved, seek a judicial order invalidating the agency action.40 
The Supreme Court has encountered difficulty in precisely defining 
the discretionary function exception’s scope.41  However, the Court has 
repeatedly noted that the exception covers decisions “grounded in social, 
economic, or political goals,” thus ensuring that such decisions are not 
second-guessed in the context of a tort action.42 Thus, the exception 
“protects only governmental actions and decisions based on 
considerations of public policy.”43 
During the summer of 1946, Congress not only enacted the FTCA, 
but also the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).44 The APA specified 
procedures to facilitate interested parties’ participation in agency 
adjudication and pioneered a notice-and-comment informal rulemaking 
approach that allowed the public to participate in the formation of 
informal rules.45 It also ensured the availability of judicial review, by 
35. Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (codified at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1948); Dalehite v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15, 28 & note19 (1953).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1948). 
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
39. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287 (1945); H.R. REP. NO. 77-2285 (1942); see generally, 
Ronald A. Cass, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS: 1987, 1505-06 
(1987). 
40. Cass, supra note 39, at 1513. 
41. Id. at 1548.
42. U.S. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 (1991); U.S. v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984). 
43. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323 (quoting Berkovitz v. U.S., 486 U.S. 531 (1988)). 
44. June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at scattered section of 5 U.S.C.). 
45. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1978).
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reaffirming the presumption of reviewability.46 However, the APA does 
not provide a damages remedy.47 The APA routinized standards of review, 
establishing a deferential standard of review for most administrative 
determinations.48 Agencies’ resolution of policy questions would be 
upheld unless “arbitrary and capricious,” so long as the agency action 
neither violated the Constitution nor federal statute.49  Much of the 
subsequent development in administrative law has involved expanding 
both participatory rights in agency proceedings and the availability of 
judicial review.50 
The paradigm case for application of the discretionary function 
exception is a claim that regulatory choices embodied in statutes or 
regulations pose an unreasonable risk of physical harm or property 
damage. Obviously, having aggrieved individuals challenge such actions 
by way of damages suits is far less preferable than having them participate 
in the legislative or regulatory process and seek to overturn the statute or 
regulation if invalid. Striking the optimal balance between the societal 
goals of enhancing safety and reducing regulatory burdens should 
primarily be left to Congress or agency rule makers. 
III. SECOND-GUESSING IN THE BIVENS CONTEXT
Ziglar v. Abbasi evidences the Supreme Court’s effort to steer review 
of policy judgments away from Bivens damages actions. Is that 
appropriate? Indeed, the courts have been quite indiscriminate in finding 
potential alternative remedies sufficient to foreclose Bivens relief.51  
Would the principle that review of policy decisions should not be denied 
but merely channeled into the standard procedures for reviewing agency 
action suggest greater judicial circumspection? 
Constitutional torts differ significantly from their non-constitutional, 
unintentional tort cousins in ways that might suggest a broader role for 
damages actions. Generally, unintentional torts, particularly negligence 
claims, involve balancing the risks created by a course of conduct against 
the burden altering the conduct to reduce the risk entailed.52 Determining 
the most appropriate regulatory and administrative approaches to properly 
46. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2011), § 702 (1966), § 704 (1966).
47. See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1966). 
48. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1966).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1966). 
50. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1716 (1975). 
51. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2005).
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balance such risks and burdens are tasks peculiarly within the competence 
of administrative agencies (or other executive and legislative actors). 
Respect for agency expertise justifies according agency officials primacy 
in determining the balance between the risk of physical or economic 
injury and the government’s programmatic objectives. By contrast, 
controversies over constitutional rights are particularly appropriate for 
judicial resolution. The federal courts consider themselves the preeminent 
expositors of the U.S. Constitution.53 
Nevertheless, the executive and legislative branches have long 
played a critical role in protecting judicially-declared constitutional rights, 
and more broadly, loosely-defined constitutional values. Judicially-
declared constitutional rights often establish a floor of protection and are 
frequently supplemented by legislative and executive action.54 Indeed, 
institutional competence concerns often lead courts to under-define 
constitutional norms.55 
Moreover, given the importance and intangibility of constitutional 
rights56 which makes constitutional harms particularly difficult to 
quantify, constitutional violations should be invalidated or reversed rather 
than tolerated and “remedied” by way of damages awards. Indeed, in the 
context of motions for preliminary injunction, violations of constitutional 
rights ordinarily qualify as “irreparable harm.”57 
In this regard, the Supreme Court’s approach in section 1983 
malicious prosecution cases is instructive.58 In Heck v. Humphrey, the 
Court adverted to “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not 
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal 
judgments.”59 Accordingly, it held that when a section 1983 damages 
action turns on “the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement,” the 
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated 
or otherwise rendered nugatory.60 
53. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523-
4, 536 (1997).  
54. See, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), superseded by statute, 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as stated in Holt v. 
Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
55. See Bernard W. Bell, Marbury v. Madison and the Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 197, 202 (2003). 
56. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 707-
09 (1990). 
57. See 11A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.1 
(2d ed. 1995).  
58. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1994).
59. Id. at 486. 
60. Id. The analogy to Bivens is not complete. Unlike under Bivens, the right challenge to the 
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In short, steering constitutional litigation away from damages actions 
seems sensible.  But before the Court declares Bivens actions 
inappropriate in a particular context, it should critically examine the 
alternative means of either vindicating constitutional rights or at least 
restraining government officials’ unconstitutional actions.  Important 
aspects of any such mechanisms are: (1) a process affording individuals 
effected to have “an opportunity to be heard” before the impact of the 
government’s decision is permanently felt, i.e., a participatory 
administrative process, (2) judicial review of the validity of the 
government official’s action before the impact of that action becomes 
irreversible, and (3) transparency. These aspects ensure that effected 
citizens can participate in the process before the official actions becomes 
final and that an independent body sensitive to constitutional rights 
reviews the decision. 
A. The Contextual Analysis 
Sometimes government officials act in ways that cause permanent 
harm without the constraint of either meaningful administrative 
supervision or judicial review. The 1970s/1980s Bivens trilogy all involve 
such situations. Often, however, there is some supervision or review of 
official action before it becomes irrevocable. There are at least four modes 
of constraining official action: (1) ex ante judicial determination, (2) 
participatory agency processes followed by judicial review, (3) ex post 
judicial review providing “specific” remedies, and (4) non-Bivens 
damages actions. Each will be assessed in terms of participatory rights, 
judicial review, and transparency. In some circumstances justiciability 
doctrines and secrecy partially undermine the effectiveness of these 
potential avenues of review. 
1. Official Action Not Subject to Meaningful Supervision or
Judicial Review
Bivens liability is particularly critical where official action is 
unconstrained by either internal administrative review or judicial review. 
Federal agencies ordinarily establish some internal mechanism for 
hierarchical control. Such mechanisms enable managerial control over 
agency officials, and seek to ensure consistent treatment of regulated 
validity of a conviction does not bar plaintiff’s § 1983 action. Heck v. Humphrey merely requires that 
such challenge be made, and made successfully, before a damages action is commenced. 
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entities, program beneficiaries, and the public.61 Managerial controls will 
typically neither incorporate participation by those subject to official 
action nor judicial review. Neither do they routinely ensure transparency.  
Sometimes these managerial controls leave capacious discretion to lower 
level employees as a matter of necessity. In such instances, some 
decisions by low-level employees implementing policy may largely be 
uncontrollable, as a practical matter, at least before those employees act 
in ways that irreparably breach individuals’ constitutional rights. The 
prototypical example is the law enforcement officer deciding whether to 
conduct a warrantless search. 
The three cases in which the Court has upheld a Bivens remedy all 
involve officials who were not subject to meaningful constraint in acting 
or failing to act in ways that infringed upon plaintiffs’ constitutional 
rights. Bivens involved a warrantless search.62 Carlson v. Green involved 
low-level prison officials’ failure to summon a physician for an inmate in 
acute distress.  The officials did not need authorization to refrain from 
calling in a physician; their exercise of discretion was not subject to ex 
ante review, even by supervisors. The Congressman in Davis v. Passman 
possessed unconstrained and unreviewable discretion over his personal 
congressional staff. 
The Court has recognized the unique problem caused by individual 
official’s unrestrained discretion in both the Bivens and procedural due 
process contexts. In Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Kennedy asserted that, by 
“their very nature,” individual instances of discrimination or law 
enforcement overreach are difficult to address except by way of damages 
actions after the fact.”63 For the Court, this seems an intuitive proposition. 
However, the inability to provide ex ante remedies is attributable to the 
breadth of the direction certain government officials enjoy, not the nature 
of the constitutional right is involved. 
In the procedural due process setting, the Court has held that a failure 
to prevent random or unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by 
government officials is not a violation of due process, because no prior 
hearing could possibly be held.64 As the Court explained in Parratt v. 
Taylor, such deprivations do not “occur as a result of some established 
61. Sun Ray Drive-In Diary v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm’n, , 517 P.2d 289, 293 (Ore.
App. 1973); See also, JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 26 (1985).  
62. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
63. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1862; accord Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring).
64. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-34 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543
(1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
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state procedure” but “as a result of the unauthorized failure of agents of 
the State to follow established state procedure.”65 But often official action 
is subject to meaningful supervision, control, review, and correction. Four 
types of mechanisms to cabin official discretion are discussed below. 
2. Four Modes for Constraining Unconstitutional Conduct
a. Ex Ante Judicial Determinations
In some circumstances, procedures exist for an ex ante de novo 
judicial determination of the constitutional validity of a government 
official’s contemplated action. The warrant requirement governing 
searches and seizures provides a prime example.66  It seeks to ensure that 
the existence of probable cause is determined by a neutral magistrate 
rather than law enforcement agents “engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”67 And the judicial determination is de 
novo, the judge must decide whether there is probable cause; agents’ 
“reasonable” belief that probable cause exists is insufficient.68 As Justice 
Rehnquist observed in his Butz v. Economou concurrence, “the safeguards 
built into the judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages 
actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.”69 This trust 
in the protections offered by interposing a neutral magistrate in the 
investigative process led the Court to craft a “good faith” exception to the 
exclusionary rule, permitting use of the fruits of a search even if the 
magistrate erred in finding probable cause for the search to exist.70 
Granted, the warrant process does not offer pre-search transparency, 
nor does the target of the search enjoy any participatory rights in that 
process.71 Nevertheless, permitting Bivens claims against officers 
conducting searches authorized by warrants is inappropriate, because the 
pre-search de novo judicial review of the warrant offers adequate 
65. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543. (Thus, random or unauthorized deprivations of property become
due process violations only if state common law remedies fail to provide full ex post relief). 
66. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 738 (2011). 
67. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
68. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978). 
69. 438 U.S. at 512. 
70. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). 
71. While a third party holding the target’s records may receive notice, their interests may not 
be congruent with the target’s.  See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Tech Companies Concede to Surveillance 
Program, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/technology/tech-
companies-bristling-concede-to-government-surveillance-efforts.html; see generally, Rainey 
Reitman, Who Has Your Back: Government Data Requests 2017 (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2017#major-findings-trends. 
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protection. 
However, law enforcement officials should not be relieved of Bivens 
liability if they abuse the warrant process. Issuance of a warrant based on 
a knowingly false assertion by the law enforcement officers should not 
serve to immunize from Bivens liability either the officer making the false 
assertion or officers executing the warrant with knowledge of the 
falsehood.  Such a rule is consistent with the limits on the “good faith” 
exception to the exclusionary rule72 and Franks v. Delaware, which 
allows defendants to challenge the veracity of the affidavits supporting 
warrants that have already been executed.73 
b. Participatory Agency Process Followed by Judicial Review
Sometimes Congress establishes a participatory agency process 
followed by deferential judicial review before the government action can 
be completed. Bush v. Lucas, involving the termination of public 
employment, and Schweiker v. Chillicky, regarding the award of social 
security disability benefits, involved just such administrative schemes.74 
Indeed, both cases involve trial-type processes. Any deprivation of a right 
while such processes move forward is often temporary, and reversible. 
Indeed, the remedial scheme itself may allow compensation for the 
temporary deprivations should the party deprived of the right prevail. 
Bush v. Lucas and Schweiker v. Chillicky seem to have outsized influence 
in Bivens cases.  The Court cites them in finding that sufficient means to 
vindicate constitutional violations exist to preclude Bivens relief, even 
when the processes identified are quite unlike the trial-type process 
involved in those two cases. 
The APA’s procedural requirements for informal rulemaking do not 
require trial-type proceedings. Nevertheless, as with trial-type 
adjudicatory proceedings, interested parties have a right to participate in 
the proceeding in the form of submission of written comments at a 
minimum, and to secure judicial review, again on a deferential basis. 
Of course, doctrines of standing, ripeness, or non-reviewability 
might inhibit judicial review.75 But often, at least these sorts of agency 
adjudicatory schemes, particularly those that involve trial type hearings, 
72. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.
73. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 168.  See generally, Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 787-88 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
74. Bush, 462 U.S. at 368, 381-90 (“[t]he question is . . . whether an elaborate remedial system 
that has been constructed . . . should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy” for 
constitutional violations); Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 414. 
75. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
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incorporate a right of review that is rarely frustrated by such doctrines. 
Such processes might also be frustrated by government secrecy and the 
use of secret law,76 but secrecy in such circumstances is not the norm. 
c. Ex post Judicial Review Providing “Specific” Remedies
Some administrative processes do not permit outside participation in 
the administrative process. Nevertheless, the resulting agency decision 
may be subject to judicial review. And such judicial review may produce 
an order declaring the agency action invalid and thus nugatory. While the 
standard specific relief might consist of an order declaring the 
government’s action invalid, an order requiring corrective relief or 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus addressing a detainee’s conditions of 
confinement might also qualify as ex post specific remedies.77 
Neal Katyal has provided the impetus for a school of thought that 
seeks to structure internal agency processes in ways that protect 
constitutional rights.78 The structures recommended do not necessarily 
involve increasing potential subject’s participation in agency processes. 
Indeed, they may be designed for processes in which such participation is 
impractical. Katyal, for example, focuses on foreign policy decision-
making.79 But these techniques may provide for more robust debate 
among government officials about the relevant constitutional constraints, 
enhancing constitutional protections.80 
Agencies often craft general policies governing agency officials’ 
conduct that such officials must apply. The policy may be adopted by 
regulation or more informally well before an agency official applies it to 
a particular person in a manner that may infringe upon his constitutional 
rights. Ideally a concern about protecting high-level policy decisions from 
second-guessing through the medium of tort litigation might suggest that 
76. City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 733 (1984), aff’d, Bowen v. City of New York, 
476 U.S. 467, 468 (1986) (excusing exhaustion requirement because of agency’s use of secret law); 
Center for Effective Government v. U.S. Department of State, 7 F. Supp. 3d 16, 29-30 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(FOIA designed to preclude development of “secret law”); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D), § 552(a)(2) 
(requiring publication of substantive rules of general applicability and the like). 
77. For the distinction between “specific” remedies and “substitutionary” remedies, see 
Laycock, supra note 56, at 696. 
78. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006). 
79. Id. 
80. PFANDER, supra note 23, at 95. (“The resulting culture of law compliance within the
Department of Justice pervades the various agencies of government, providing the basis for an 
argument that the executive branch itself does a credible job of ensuring its own compliance with 
legal norms.”). 
90 CONLAWNOW [9:77 
any policy with constitutional implications should be subject to judicial 
review once promulgated. Concomitantly, consideration of the policy 
should not occur for the first time in a Bivens action against the agency 
officials who promulgated the policy or the lower-level employee who 
followed it. If the policy is upheld against post-promulgation attack, a 
Bivens remedy should be available only against agency officials who 
violate the policy and, in doing so, contravene an individual’s 
constitutional rights. Moreover, perhaps an express, reasonable 
consideration of constitutional issues might be considered relevant to the 
imposition of Bivens liability, all the more so if the agency’s constitutional 
determination is publicly available, allowing members of the public to 
participate in the process or at least challenge the policy prior to its 
implementation. 
Consider the law enforcement practice of permitting journalists to 
accompany them during law enforcement operations, including execution 
of search warrants, i.e., media ride-alongs.  Such ride-alongs have 
potential constitutional implications, particularly when private dwellings 
are searched.  In 1999, the Court held that such ride-alongs violated 
homeowners’ Fourth Amendment rights.81 Before 1999, the U.S. 
Marshals Service had issued a pamphlet regarding ride-alongs to guide 
Deputy Marshals. The policy did not address potential constitutional 
issues, except for one passing reference to privacy considerations, and did 
not seek to constrain Deputy Marshals’ exercise of discretion.  However, 
suppose the policy had sought to constrain Deputy Marshals’ discretion, 
but concluded that Deputy Marshals could permit journalists to 
accompany them into private homes. Ideally, the policy would have been 
subject to judicial review upon promulgation, eliminating the need for a 
damages action to challenge the constitutionality of ride-alongs involving 
entry into private residences.  A Bivens action could remain available for 
circumstances in which a Deputy Marshal’s action was both unauthorized 
by the agency’s ride-along policy and violative of Fourth Amendment. 
Such an approach would limit Bivens actions to inappropriate applications 
of policies that had already been subject to direct review. 
But this approach has drawbacks. First, judicially-crafted 
justiciability and reviewability doctrines may preclude early challenges to 
general policies. Second, secrecy may prevent the public from learning of 
the governments’ policies or techniques until after they have been applied 
in numerous instances.  Third, sometimes impacted individuals may have 
little incentive to mount a challenge to a government policy until the 
81. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). 
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policy is applied to them. 
General reviewability doctrines, including APA-specific doctrines, 
as well as justiciability doctrines such as ripeness and standing may, and 
perhaps often will cause problems for plaintiffs seeking to challenge 
general policies, or even more specific official actions, before they 
become irrevocable. 
Wilkie v. Robbins,82 is a Bivens case in which APA-specific doctrines 
might well have stood in the way of securing meaningful injunctive relief 
by other avenues. Plaintiff alleged that federal officials had taken a series 
of actions in retaliation for his refusal to confer an easement over his 
property. The landowner could have, and in fact did, contest many of those 
actions.83  But the crux of his complaint was that the series of retaliatory 
actions, taken together, infringed upon his Fifth Amendment right to 
enjoyment of his property. In short, plaintiff was complaining about being 
subject to “death by a thousand cuts.”84 Robbins might have been unable 
to bring an APA claim to stop the harassment.  Norton v. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance (“SUWA”), precludes plaintiffs from bringing 
programmatic challenges to government administration of programs, and 
thus limits plaintiffs to challenging discrete actions.85 
Clapper v. Amnesty International, U.S.A.,86 provides an example of 
standing doctrine posing a potential bar to challenging unconstitutional 
policies.  Even though the government was likely to use authority 
conferred by a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) amendment 
to intercept communications of foreign nationals, the prospect of such 
interception was too remote to confer standing on organizations that 
maintain frequent confidential communications with foreign nationals as 
clients, partners, and sources.  The Court explained that the “threatened 
injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.”87 It found 
the likelihood of interception of conversations too speculative.  Given the 
secrecy of the FISA warrants, at best plaintiffs could establish that their 
conversations were being intercepted when the Government sought to use 
the communication of the foreign national in a criminal prosecution.88 
82. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
83. Id. at 551-54. 
84. Id. at 555. 
85. 542 U.S. 55, 64-65 (2004). While SUWA is an “inaction” case, it suggests that APA
challenges with broad programmatic complaints rather than circumscribed, discrete agency actions 
are not justiciable under the APA. 
86. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
87. Id. at 409. 
88. See Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge the NSA’s bulk metadata collection program because they had not yet established that NSA 
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Secrecy may mean that government policies will not be challenged 
before widely applied. Indeed, such secrecy may mean that even the 
application of the policy to particular individuals cannot be challenged 
until after their effect has become irreversible. Often law enforcement 
techniques or military action outside the United States remain secret for 
significant periods.89 The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) includes 
exceptions for law enforcement records, particularly those revealing law 
enforcement techniques,90 as well as for properly classified national 
security information.91 The APA “notice and comment” requirements for 
informal rulemaking exempt the country’s military and foreign affairs 
functions.92 
Thus, many people were no doubt subjected to targeted drone strikes, 
extraordinary rendition, and pervasive National Security Agency wiretaps 
and bulk metadata collection before such matters come to light. Even 
domestic programs involving non-consensual human testing on military 
personnel and civilians continued for years in secrecy.93 The effect of such 
programs on individuals before the government’s conduct is revealed 
cannot be undone. At that point, only a damages remedy will do. 
A third reason precluding Bivens claims that challenge policy as 
unworkable is suggested by the ride-along hypothetical.  In that context, 
limiting Bivens actions for Fourth Amendment violations that result from 
failure to follow agency guidelines is troubling because homeowners have 
little reason to mount a challenge to any general policy guidance involving 
ride-alongs before it affects them. 
d. Non-Bivens Damages Remedies
Non-Bivens damages remedies can provide recompense for a 
government official’s infringements of citizens’ rights. Various federal 
statutes, like the FTCA, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,94 the 
had collected their metadata). 
89. See Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 522 (1985) (national security tasks are conducted
in secret, making it “far more likely that actual abuses will go uncovered than that fancied abuses” 
will give rise to litigation.). With respect to foreign affairs, see U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 
299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).  
90. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2016). 
91. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2016). Indeed, under subsection (c)(3), an agency need not
acknowledge the existence of records “pertaining to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, or 
international terrorism.” 
92. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1978). 
93. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (secret experiment involving
administering LSD to Army personnel). 
94. 42 U.S. Code § 2000bb–1(c) (1993). 
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Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,95 and the Privacy 
Act,96 create damages causes of action.  Indirectly, state common law tort 
actions might provide a remedy for injuries arising out of unconstitutional 
conduct.  These remedies offer an advantage over Bivens only with respect 
their constitutional legitimacy; unlike the Bivens remedy they need not be 
created by federal courts.  They provide the same types of relief available 
in a Bivens action, namely damages awards.  Such damages actions 
involve judges second-guessing decisions made by others, as do Bivens 
actions.  Federal statutory damages causes of action have a significant 
advantage over state common law tort (or FTCA) causes of action; they 
do not turn on the vagaries of state tort law to control federal actors. These 
focused federal statutes may offer a more protective standard than the 
judicially-declared constitutional right at issue and can be tailored to the 
right at issue.  This aspect of the statutes may make them more appropriate 
to deem alternative remedies preemptive of Bivens liability. 
B. The Contextual Approach and the Court’s Ziglar Factors 
In the Bivens area certainty is desirable, given government officials’ 
potential personal liability. Consideration of context, as suggested above, 
can be quite complex. For that reason alone, perhaps embracing a 
contextual approach seems problematic. However, the suggested 
contextual analysis may be no more complex than the analogical exercise 
the Ziglar v. Abbasi Court imposed upon federal judges. The Court’s 
listing of multiple factors whose significance it leaves unexplained 
provides little certainty, unless one considers it a subterfuge obscuring the 
Justices’ decision not recognize any new Bivens actions. 
Consideration of the contours of a regime for constraining 
unconstitutional conduct surely seems more relevant to the 
appropriateness of implying a Bivens remedy than most of the Ziglar v. 
Abbasi factors. Why does the constitutional right at issue matter?  The 
Court does not explain why some constitutional rights give rise to Bivens 
claims, but others do not. A remedial context analysis may provide a 
rationale. In particular, some rights are less likely to be violated absent 
judicial error (because they are related to criminal adjudication). Others, 
like procedural due process violations, may more readily be rectified. For 
others, a damages-type remedy may already exist, such as inverse 
condemnation actions to remedy Takings Clause violations. 
95. 42 U.S. Code § 2000cc–2 (2000) (judicial relief provision). 
96. 5 U.S. Code § 552(a)(g)(1) (2016) ((civil action); 5 U.S. Code § 552(a)(i)(1) (2016)
(criminal action). 
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Consideration of the defendant’s rank may simply seem elitist.  Or it 
may merely serve to ensure that one official does not have extensive 
Bivens liability for broadly-applicable policies.97  A contextual approach 
suggests an additional explanation.  High-level officials ordinarily make 
decisions only after some process of deliberation involving subordinates. 
Low-level officials are much more likely to act without the same level of 
intra-agency deliberation.  High-ranking officials’ reduced risk of Bivens 
liability might best be conceived as a reflection of the likelihood that 
serious institutional deliberation occurs before such officials act. 
The “generality or specificity of the official action” may matter in 
terms of the likelihood of some meaningful process preceding the taking 
of the action.  Promulgating a guideline authorizing ride-along searches is 
more likely to involve broad-scale consideration, which encompasses 
agency lawyers, than an officer’s decision to permit a ride-along in a 
particular case.  But aside from this, it is not clear what relevance the 
generality of specificity of the official action has, except a concern for the 
extensiveness of potential liability based on a broadly applicable decision. 
How is “the extent of judicial guidance” regarding the problem the 
officer confronted relevant to whether a Bivens action should be implied? 
The Court does not tell us.  Seemingly such a consideration is fully 
considered in the qualified immunity analysis, which is relevant only after 
the Court decides a Bivens cause of action can be implied. 
The Court does not explain how and why “the statutory or other legal 
mandate under which the officer was operating” matters. It is not clear 
what aspect of the mandate of the Drug Enforcement officer in Bivens, for 
instance, was important. Why should it make a difference that the 
National Park Service’s Law Enforcement Division or the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection Agency statutory authorizations diverge from each 
other or that of the DEA? Perhaps the difference, if any, relates to the 
importance of the law enforcement mission and a particular need for its 
fearless execution. But a contextual analysis suggests that the key should 
be whether the statutory or legal mandate specifies constraints that limit 
the officer’s authority so as to safeguard constitutional rights.98 
97. Some courts have suggested that the scale of high-level officials’ liability for
unconstitutional action could be limited by requiring a finding that the official had personal 
responsibility for the constitutional violation before Bivens liability could be imposed.  See Vance v. 
Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203-05 (7th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 768 (9th Cir. 2012). 
98. The relevance of some of the factors are more discernable, such as “[t]he risk of disruptive 
intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches” and “the presence of potential special 
factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.” 
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s statements in Ziglar v. Abbasi regarding second-
guessing policy decisions should not dismissed as stray remarks; they will 
likely become a part of the Court’s mantra in future Bivens cases. Inherent 
in those statements is a preference for direct review of official decisions 
over indirect review via damages actions. But the Court should refine its 
consideration of the available means of, at the very least, controlling 
government officials’ potentially-unconstitutional conduct, and ideally, 
giving individuals the right to secure invalidation and reversal of such 
conduct. There are several means by which these opportunities to 
invalidate and rectify unconstitutional conduct may be provided, but not 
all should be considered adequate to redress potential constitutional 
injuries. An analysis focused on alternative means to control official 
conduct and provide individuals a means for redress may make some 
sense of the list of factors the Ziglar v. Abbasi Court offers lower courts 
deciding whether to recognize a new Bivens cause of action. And such an 
approach would focus courts on aspects of potential Bivens claims that 
seem most relevant. 
